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Information Access Rights Based on
International Human Rights Law
HENRY

H. PERRITT, JR.t

CHRISTOPHER J. LHULIERtt
INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest promises of the global information infrastructure is improved public access to government information.
As court decisions, legislative enactments, and rules of administrative agencies become available through the Internet's World
Wide Web, the rule of law is strengthened. The legitimacy of
public institutions increases when the public knows what the institutions are doing. Compliance with the law increases when
the law is available. Accountability and quality of government
decision-making improves when members of the public have information allowing them to express meaningful views before decisions are made. Already, more than 850 federal agencies in
the United States have Web sites providing information about
their organizations and containing materials that make it easier
for the public to participate in their proceedings.' All of the
opinions of the federal appellate courts are available in full text
form and in popular word processing formats on the World Wide
Web, 2 and a growing number of state courts 3 and agencies 4 also
publish information on the Web. Most major international institutions also have Web sites. 5
t Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; member of the bar, Virginia, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, Maryland,
United States Supreme Court. Dean Perritt appreciates the contributions of April M.
M ajor, who presented this paper at the University at Buffalo Law School Cyberlaw Symposium held in spring 1997.
it Villanova University School of Law, Class of 1998; law clerk to Professor Perritt;
and coordinator for Open Government, Project Bosnia.
1. See generally Villanova Center for Information Law and Policy, Oct. 7, 1997
<http//www.vcilp.org/fedWeb> (Web site containing links to federal agencies) (on file
with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
2. See id. at <http/www.vcilp.org/fedcourt>.
3. Id. at <http:/www.vcilp.orgfstatecourts>.
4. Id. at <http:J/www.vcilp.org/stateWeb>.
5. E.g., Council of Europe, Oct. 7, 1997 <http:J/www.coe.fr> (on file with author and
the Buffalo Law Review); European Union, Oct. 7, 1997 <http://europa.eu.int> (on file
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The effort to build the rule of law in former communist
countries is supported by the development of constitutionalism,
implemented through independent constitutional courts in the
newly independent states. 6 Most of these constitutional courts
have committed themselves to link to each other through the Internet, permitting each of them to build on international human
rights texts as required by their domestic constitutions,
and to
7
share their own interpretations of human rights.
Unfortunately, not all governments make their information
resources available for electronic access. This reluctance of some
governments stems from the communist era in which public access to information about government activities either was unnecessary or was actively opposed. In other cases, the motivation is not to discourage public participation in government, but
to make money. Many government institutions recognize the economic value of government information in electronic form and
also recognize that monopolists can extract more revenue by
maintaining control and discouraging competition. Accordingly,
they set up government-run or government-sponsored monopolies to sell access to their information resources while blocking
access by others.8
with author and the Buffalo Law Review); G7 Summits, Oct. 7, 1997 <http:ll
utll.library.utoronto.ca/www/g7> (information society projects arising out of Brussels
summit) (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review); G7 Summits, Oct. 7, 1997
<http-//www.ispo.cec.beg7/projidx.html> (information society projects arising out of Brussels summit) (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review). A committee of experts
is preparing material for higher level G7 consideration pertaining to harmful uses of the
Internet. The author is a member of the committee of experts. International Civil Aviation Organization, Oct. 7, 1997 <http'//www.cam.org/-icao> (summarizing legal basis and
history of ICAO) (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review); International Telecommunications Union, Oct. 7, 1997 <http://www.itu.ch> (on file with author and the
Buffalo Law Review); United Nations, Oct. 7, 1997 <httpl//www.un.org/> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review); NATO, Oct. 7, 1997 <http/vww.nato.int>; Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development, Oct. 7, 1997 <http://www.oecd.org/> (on
file with author and the Buffalo Law Review); Organizationfor Security and Cooperation
in Europe, Oct. 7, 1997 <http'I/www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review); United Nations Committee on InternationalTrade and Law, Oct. 7,
1997 <http:l/www.un.or.at/uncitral/index.html> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law
Review); World Intellectual Property Organization,Oct. 7, 1997 <http//www.wipo.org/eng/
index.htm> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review); World Trade Organization, Oct. 7, 1997 <http//www.wto.org/> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law
Review).
6. See generally Sara Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern European Constitutional
Courts and the AntimajoritarianObjection to JudicialReview, 26 LAw & PoLY INT'L Bus.
1201 (1995).
7. See Central and Eastern European Civic Institution Locator,Nov. 13, 1997 <http'J
/www.vcilp.org/ceecil/whatis.html> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
8. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access PublicInformation, 4 WM. &
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State sponsored monopolies over government information

are undesirable for a number of reasons. Monopolies make it
easier for censorship to occur. Monopolies usually perpetuate

older information technologies because monopolists have no economic incentive to introduce new technologies, thus depriving
consumers of the benefits of new technology. Monopolies rarely
serve the needs of particular consuming communities as well as

a competitive market structure because no monopolist can understand and cater to the needs of specialized communities as
well as a competitive specialist.

Accordingly, information policy should commit to and encourage a diversity of sources and channels for government in-

formation.9 This policy is best implemented by a legal framework that grants anyone a right of access to basic government
information and also gives everyone a privilege to disseminate
that information in other forms. 10 In some countries, such rights

and privileges are deeply imbedded in current law. In the
MARY BLL oF RTs. J. 179, 184 (1995) and Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Should Local Governments Sell Local Spatial Databases Through State Monopolies?, 35 JuuAErmcs J. 449,
454-55 (1995) (both explaining and criticizing agency temptations to set up state monopolies over government information).
9. A good example of a commitment to a policy of diversity is expressed in the
Paperwork Reduction Act Amendments of 1996, Pub.L. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995),
which amended 44 U.S.C. § 3506 to read:
(d) With respect to information dissemination, each agency shall(1) ensure that the public has timely and equitable access to the
agency's public information, including ensuring such access through(A) encouraging a diversity of public and private sources for information based on government public information;
(B) in cases in which the agency provides public information
maintained in electronic format, providing timely and equitable access to the underlying data (in whole or in part); and
(C) agency dissemination of public information in an efficient, effective, and economical manner ....
10. The Paperwork Reduction Act amendments to 44 U.S.C. § 3506(d), appropriately
continues:
(4) [With respect to information dissemination, each agency shall] not, except where specifically authorized by statute(A) establish an exclusive, restricted, or other distribution arrangement that interferes with timely and equitable availability of
public information to the public;
(B) restrict or regulate the use, resale, or redissemination of public information by the public;
(C) charge fees or royalties for resale or redissemination of public
information; or
(D) establish user fees for public information that exceed the cost
of dissemination.
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United States, this entitlement is codified in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)," and in similar state statutes in almost
every state.12 In Sweden, the entitlement is guaranteed by the
13
Constitution.
The European Commission presently is engaged in drafting
a Green Paper on access to public information, under a mandate
of the Maastricht Treaty, that requires the functions of European governmental institutions to become more transparent.
While the exact content of the not-yet-released Green Paper cannot be known, the author of this Article has participated as a
consultant in meetings of Directorate General 13 of the European Commission, responsible for drafting the paper, and knows
that there is broad agreement on several basic propositions:
(1) European law and national law within Europe should provide a legal
entitlement to access government information;
(2) Exceptions to such an entitlement should be enumerated and strictly
construed;
(3) Access rights should extend to electronic formats; and
(4) There should be some appeal mechanism when access is denied.

There is less agreement on the question whether a legitimate
interest must be shown, and whether commercial motives might
disqualify a requester or result in conditions being imposed on
access.
As national and regional sources of information access
rights are being worked out, international human rights law
provides a useful framework for realizing freedom of information
and open government. This Article explains the basic sources of
a right to access and republish government information found in
international human rights texts, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 4 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 5 and the European Convention on Human
11. 5 US.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
12. See ag., MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.03, 13.99 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61
§ 24.A.5. (1988 & West Supp. 1996); see also Perritt, Sources of Rights to Access Public
Information, supra note 8, at 190-97.
13. SWED. CONST. (The Instrument of Government, 1989), ch. 2, art. 1 (2) (guaranteeing freedom of information); SwFD. CONST. (Freedom of the Press Act), ch. 2, art. 2 (guaranteeing access to official documents).
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A(HI), U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, GA Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, UN. Doc. A/6316, 999 UN.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPRI.
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Rights. 16 It also briefly reviews the provisions of the constitutions of the former communist countries that grant rights or recognize the privilege of accessing and disseminating government
information.
While there is little case law interpreting these provisions
in the context of efforts to publish government information electronically, this Article suggests that the American Freedom of
Information Act provides a useful analytical framework within
which to evaluate rights of access and legitimate privileges for
withholding access. It develops arguments in favor of broad access and dissemination rights based on European and International Human Rights law. The analysis grows out of the authors'
work through Project Bosnia and CEECIL17 to develop freedom
of information, open government, and Internet-based legal and
civic affairs information infrastructures in former communist
countries.
I.

UNITED STATES FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The United States Freedom of Information Act' 8 has a bi-

partite structure. Subsection (a) affirmatively grants a right of
access and affirmatively imposes a duty for government agencies

to publish certain information.

9 Anyone

has standing to request

16. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
17. See Central and Eastern European Civic Institution Locator, supra note 7. Project Bosnia is a student-faculty initiative jointly sponsored by Chicago-Kent College of
Law at Illinois Institute of Technology and the Willanova University School of Law, organized by Perritt. It seeks to accelerate the development of the rule of law and civil society in Bosnia by connecting legal and civic institutions (including the media) to each
other and to the world community through the Internet. The Eastern and Central European Network (ECEULnet) is a joint activity of the Chicago-Kent College of Law and the
Center for Information Law and Policy, aimed at promoting constitutionalism in former
communist countries in Eurasia by linking their constitutional courts to the Internet.
The Central and East European Civic Institution Locator (CEECIL) complements Project
Bosnia and ECEULnet by developing and assisting civic institutions to deploy compatible case management, electronic publishing and virtual library functions implemented
through the Internet's World Wide Web. Author Perritt is the director of all three of
these activities. Author Lhulier worked through Project Bosnia with the Government of
Bosnia, the US. Agency for International Development and the American Bar Association CEELI office in Sarajevo to develop freedom of information and open government
commitments for the State of Bosnia.
18. 5 US.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
19. Id. at § 552(a)(1) & (2) (obligating agencies to publish information about their
organization); Id. at § 552(a)(3) (granting a residual right to access other types of agency
records on request).
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agency records without showing any particular interest. 20 The
scope of the affrmative obligation to make information available
is circumscribed by the definition of agency record. Covered
agencies need not create records, but only provide access to existing ones. 21 Under 1996 amendments, "record" unambiguously
includes electronic formats. 22 Agency is broadly defined, although it does not include the Congress or the courts.23
Under the 1996 Amendments, 24 the affirmative obligation to
publish information extends to records requested on an ad hoc
basis "which, because of the nature of their subject matter, the
agency determines have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent request for substantially the same record . . . ",25 Agencies must make a general index of such
records available, 26 by computer telecommunications on or after
December 31, 1999, and also must make available within oneyear records created on or after November 1, 1996, by computer
telecommunications or, if that is not feasible, by other electronic
27
means.
Agencies must honor format requests if the record is readily
reproducible by the agency in that form, specifically including
electronic forms or formats. 28 However, international public access law recognizes that the state may have a legitimate interest in denying access to certain classes of information.2 9 The
United States FOIA is no exception. It contains eight enumerated exceptions, protecting from disclosure national security information, 30 internal agency personnel rules and practices, 31 in20. Id. at § 552(a).
21. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
23. Id. at § 552(f)(1) (Supp. 1996). "Agency as defined in § 551(1) of this title includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory
agency... ." Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3049 (1996).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D).
26. Id. at § 552(a)(2)(E).
27. Id. at § 552(a)(2)(E)(7).

28. Id. at § 552 (a)(3)(B)-(D).
29. See, eg., SWED.CONST. (Swedish Freedom of the Press Act) ch. 2, art. 2 (authorizing restrictions on access necessary to protect security of realm; central finance policy;
control of public authorities; criminal prosecution; public economic interest; protection of
privacy, and the preservation of animal or plant species).

30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
31. Id. at § 552(b)(2).
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formation that would invade personal privacy, 32 information that
would compromise commercial secrets, 33 information clothed
with executive privilege, the disclosure of which would chill candid internal deliberation and advice giving,34 information explicitly protected from disclosure by other statutes, 35 information
that would compromise criminal investigations and prosecuinstitutions, 37
tions,3 6 information on the condition of financial
38
and geological and geophysical information.
The exceptions are strictly construed under U.S. law. There
is also a presumption favoring disclosure. Agencies resisting disclosure bear the burden of establishing coverage of information
by one of the enumerated exceptions.3 9 Under some state laws,
but not under the federal FOIA, those seeking access to government information must demonstrate a "legitimate" interest in
order to access the information. Some states deny access when
the interest is purely commercial. Such a limitation places a significant burden on requesters, 4° representing a barrier to press
to extend the reach of pubaccess and access by those who seek
41
lic information by republishing it.

Another potential limitation under some state law, which
also has been hinted at by some concurring and dissenting opinions authored by justices of the United States Supreme Court,
would limit access to types of information that reveal the operations of government and would deny access as a matter of right
to information that is of a commercial nature. 42 The problem
with this distinction is that much of the information that repre32. Id. at i 552(b)(6).
33. Id. at § 552(b)(4).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

§ 552(b)(5).
§ 552(b)(3).
§ 552(b)(7).
§ 552(b)(8).
§ 552(b)(9).

39. See United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 US. 136, 142 n.3

(1989) (noting that "[the burden is on the agency to demonstrate, not the requester to
disprove, that the materials sought are not 'agency records' or have not been 'improperly
withheld:"); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (denying access to law enforcement records under general principle).
40. See Sean E. Andrussier, The Freedom of InformationAct in 1990: More Freedom
for the Government; Less Information for the Public, 1991 DUKE L.J. 753 (1991) (criticizing drift in lower court decisions to weigh public interest in favor of disclosure in evaluating some FOIA requests; Act contemplates categorical (unconditional) disclosure of certain categories of information).
41. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access Public Information, supra
note 8,at 179.
42. See generally HENRY H. PERRrrr, JR., LAw AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

ch. 11 (1996) (analyzing interpretations of state FOIA statutes).
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sents government output, such as court decisions and legislative
enactments, have commercial value. Other information that appears to be a commercial product produced by government, such
as maps, charts, and land records, is necessary in order for citizens to participate meaningfully in governmental proceedings.
The basic FOIA rights are complemented by agency obligations under the Paperwork Reduction Act not to restrict redissemination and to promote a diversity of sources and channels
for dissemination of government information.4
H.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
The European Convention on Human Rights and The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights all refer to the right "to receive information and ideas." Article 10 of the European Convention
reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."

Under protocols 9 and 11 of the European Convention, individuals may now bring claims before the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). Previously, only states had standing.
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:
Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

43. See supra notes 9-10.
44. European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10.

19971
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The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided
by law and are necessary:
For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
For the protection of national security or of public order (ordrepublic), or
of public health or morals.4

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
adopted a "Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information in 1982," 46 declaring the goal of, among other things,
"the pursuit of an open information policy in the public sector,
including access to information, in order to enhance the individual's understanding of, and his ability to discuss freely political,
social, economic and cultural matters."47 Moreover, the declaration committed itself to a diversity of channels and sources: "the
existence of a wide variety of independent and autonomous media, permitting the reflection of diversity of ideas and opinions."4 The Declaration also opposed access restrictions on intermediaries: "the availability and access on reasonable terms to
adequate facilities for the domestic and international transmission and dissemination of information and ideas."49 Finally, it
committed, "to ensure that new information and communication
techniques and services, where available, are effectively used to
broaden the scope of freedom of expression and information."50
The declaration specifically references article 10 of the European
Convention and article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
51
Human Rights.
The new constitutions of former communist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe adopt freedom of information principles. According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation:
(1) The basic rights and liberties in conformity with the commonly recognized principles and norms of the international law shall be recognized
and guaranteed in the Russian Federation and under this Constitution.

(2) The basic rights and liberties of the human being shall be inalienable
and shall belong to everyone from birth.
45. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 19.
46. Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information, Comm. of Ministers,
70th Sess. (April 29, 1982).
47. Id. at art. 11(c).
48. Id. at art. II(d).
49. Id. at art. 11(e).
50. Id. at art. I1(e).
51. Id. at T 2.
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(3) The exercise of rights and liberties of a human being
and citizen may
52
not violate the rights and liberties of other persons.
According to article 18:
The rights and liberties of man and citizen shall have direct effect. They
shall determine the meaning, content and application of the laws, and
the activities of the legislative and executive branches and local selfgovernment, and shall be secured by the judiciary53

The Russian Constitution continues, stating that:
(1) It shall be forbidden to gather, store, use and disseminate information on the private life of any person without his/her consent.
The bodies of state authority and the bodies of local self-government and
the officials thereof shall provide to each citizen access to any documents
and materials directly affecting his/her rights and liberties unless otherwise stipulated under the law."

Finally, the Russian Constitution states that:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and speech.
(2) Propaganda or campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife is impermissible. The propaganda of social, racial,
national, religious or language superiority is forbidden.
(3) No one may be coerced into expressing one's views and convictions or
into renouncing them. Everyone shall have the right to seek, get, transfer, produce and disseminate information by any lawful means. The list
of information constituting the state secret shall be established by the
federal law. The freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited. 55

The Constitution of Slovakia provides that:
International treaties on human rights and basic liberties that were ratified by the Slovak Republic and promulgated in a manner determined by
law take precedence over its own laws, provided that they secure a

greater extent of constitutional rights and liberties.66

Article 19 guarantees the right to privacy:
(1) Everyone has the right to the preservation of his human dignity and
personal honor, and the protection of his good name.
(2) Everyone has the right to protection against unwarranted interference in his private and family life.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Russ. CONST. art. 17.
Id. at art. 18.
Id. at art. 24.
Id. at art. 29.
SLOVW, CONST. art. 11.

1997]

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

909

collec(3) Everyone has the right to protection against the unwarranted
57
tion, publication, or other illicit use of his personal data.

Article 26 guarantees freedom of expression:
(1) The freedom of speech and the right to information are guaranteed.
(2) Everyone has the right to express his views in word, writing, print,
picture, or other means as well as the right to freely seek out, receive,
and spread ideas and information without regard for state borders. The
issuing of press is not subject to licensing procedures. Enterprise in the
fields of radio and television may be pegged to the awarding of an authorization from the state. The conditions will be specified by law.
(3) Censorship is banned.
(4) The freedom of speech and the right to seek out and spread information can be restricted by law if such a measure is unavoidable in a democratic society to protect the rights and liberties of others, state security,
public order, or public health and morality.
(5) State bodies and territorial self-administration bodies are under an
obligation to provide information on their activities in an appropriate
manner and in the state language. The conditions and manner of execution will be specified by law.-

Freedom of expression is also guaranteed in the Hungarian
Constitution:
(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to the free declaration of his views and opinions, and has the right of access to information of public interest, and also the freedom to disseminate such
information.
(2) The Republic of Hungary recognizes and protects the freedom of the
Press.
(3) The law on the publicity of data and information and the law on the
freedom of the Press require the support of two-thirds of the votes of the
Members of Parliament present for ratification.
(4) For the adoption of the law on the supervision of public radio, television and news agency services, and on the appointment of their leaders;
the law on the licensing of commercial radio and television stations, and
the prevention of monopolies on information, the votes of two thirds of
the Members of Parliament present are necessary.59

Both the European Convention and the ICCPR protect the
right to receive information and the right to impart information.60 The ICCPR specifically extends to any media. 61 However,
57. Id. at art. 19.
58. Id. at art. 26.
59. HUNG. CONST. art. 61.
60. European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10(1); ICCPR, supra note 15, at art.
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both texts contemplate limitations prescribed by law and to pro-

tect a number of public interests. 62 The structure of the limita-

tion paragraph of the European Convention makes it unclear
whether the criterion "necessary in a democratic society" must
be present even when the enumerated interests are established,
or whether "necessary in a democratic society" is an alternative
basis for restricting the rights even when the enumerated interfor protecests cannot be established. The ICCPR has a catchall
63
tion of public order or of public health or morals.
The Russian Constitution guarantees the right to get, produce and65 disseminate information, 64 but the means must be
"lawful," and federal law can enumerate state secrets, which
presumably are exempt from disclosure. 66 Government authorities must provide access unless "otherwise stipulated under the
67 Also, hate speech is prohibited. 68 The Slovak Constitution
law."
similarly provides limitations when "unavoidable in a demo69
cratic society to protect," among other things, "public order."
Similarly, the obligation of government bodies to provide inforsubject to conditions and
mation "in an appropriate manner" are
70
manner of execution specified by law.

The Hungarian Constitution does not expressly condition
the right of access and the freedom of dissemination, except that
the right of access extends only to "information of public interest"

1l

The constitutions of Russia, Slovakia, and Hungary incor-

porate the international human rights corpus,72 but only the
Slovak Constitution expressly establishes that as a superior
source of law to Slovakian provisions. 73 There is, in any event,
room to argue that broader information rights under interna61. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 19(2).
62. Id. at art. 19(3); European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10(2).
63. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 19(3Xb).
64. Russ. CONST. art. 29(4).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at art. 24(2).
68. Id at art. 29(2).
69. SLovy. CONST. art. 26(4).
70. Id. at art. 26(5).
71. HuNG. CONST. art. 61(1).
72. Cf. id. ch. XH (enumerating fundamental rights and duties of citizens); Russ.
CONST. ch. 2 (enumerating rights and liberties of man and citizen); SLOvK. CoNsT. ch. 2
(enumerating basic rights and freedoms).
73. SLOVX CONST. art. 11. This article states that "[t]he international agreements on
human rights and basic freedoms which were ratified by the Slovak republic and which
have been declared legal, take precedence over its laws whenever they guarantee a

wider scope of constitutional rights and freedoms." Id.
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tional human rights texts might entitle citizens of the former
communist countries to broader rights than are expressly provided in their own constitution and laws. The issue would arise
if someone claimed that a restriction of access or dissemination
imposed by the government of one of those countries violated
treaty obligations. If the treaty obligations have direct effect in
the country in which such a complaint is made, the matter could
be resolved by the national courts of that country, otherwise it
would be cognizable by the ECHR for any country that is a
member of the Council of Europe.
The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes the importance of the right to receive information. Its preamble establishes that the constitution is "guided by
the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 74
Furthermore, article 2 of the constitution's human rights section
provides that the "Federation shall ensure the application of the
highest level of internationally recognized rights and freedoms
provided in the instruments listed in the Annex."75 The UDHR
recognizes the importance of the right "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers."76 The UDHR's commitment to this principle, as well
as the Federation's commitment to ensure the application of the
UDHR, leads to the conclusion that the Federation should recognize a broad right to receive information.
With respect to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
Dayton Peace Accords provide that the parties to the agreement
"shall secure to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest
level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms." 77 This will be secured by adhering to a number of
treaties including the European Convention 78 and the ICCPR.7 9
HI. DECISIONAL LAW
In a recent case, the European Union Court of First Instance annulled a decision by the European Council to deny to a
newspaper access to certain EU documents.80 The court held
74. BoSw. & HER& CoNsr. preamble.
75. Id. at § H (human rights and fundamental freedoms).
76. UDHR, supra note 14, at art. 19.
77. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14,
1995, annex 6, 35 I.L.M. 75, 130 [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accords].
78. Id.; see also European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10.
79. Dayton Peace Accords, supra note 77, at annex 6; see also ICCPR, supra note
15, at art 19.
80. See Case T-194/94, Carvel and the Guardian Newspaper v. Council of the Euro-
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that the Council must weigh the interests of the citizens in
gaining access to documents against its own interest in confidentiality of its deliberations.81 Considering the general policy to
allow public access to documents of the institutions of the EU
and this specific Council Decision, the court correctly annulled
the refusal when it found that the Council had not genuinely
weighed the interests of both sides.
Nevertheless, there are two ECHR decisions that some commentators have interpreted to hold that "the European Convention does not encompass freedom of information in the sense
that public authorities are obliged to give information at the request of the citizen."82 The Swedish Government in the Leander
Case denied Leander employment at a naval Museum on the
grounds that he did not meet certain security requirements.8 3
Leander requested information about the contents of the government's file on him in order to deny or rebut any inaccuracies. 84
The government denied his request. 5 Among other claims, Leander argued that his "right to receive information" under article 10 of the European Convention had been violated.86 The
ECHR held that article 10 "does not.., confer on the individual
a right of access to a register containing information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation on the Government to impart such information to the individual."87
In the Gaskin Case, Gaskin was put into public care at an
early age by a local authority.8 During the time Gaskin was in
care he was boarded out with various foster parents.8 9 He contended that he was ill-treated. 90 Preparing to bring proceedings
against the local authority for negligence, Gaskin made a request for the local authority's case records. 91 Discovery was refused on the ground that these records were private and confipean Union, 1995-9/10 E.C.R. 2765 (Ct. First Instance 1995).

81. Id. at 2789.
82. FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN CA WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HumI~A

RIGHTS 223 (2d ed. 1996).
83. Leander Case, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (1987).
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 10-11.
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id. at 29. Commentators have interpreted Leander as rejecting the proposition
that article 10 confers a right of access to government information vis-a-vis the government. See Michael O'Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate Under Strasbourg Case-Law
with Reference to Easternand Central Europe, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 263, 280 (1993).
88. Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1989).

89. Id.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id.
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dential. 92 The ECHR, quoting its previous decision in Leander,
wrote:
the right to freedom to receive information basically prohibits government from restricting a person from receiving information that others
may be willing to impart to him. Also in the circumstances of the present
case, [a]rticle 10 does not embody an obligation on the state concerned to
93
impart the information in question to the individual.

The Court
held that Gaskin's article 10 rights had not been
94
violated.
Although the request for information was denied in both
cases, and both cases are problematic in basing an Americanstyle freedom of information right on article 10, neither case
supports the proposition that the right of access conferred by article 10 is narrower than that conferred by the American FOJA.
When each case is analyzed under the (FOLA), the result is the
same.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GASKIN CASE UNDER THE FOTA
FRAMEWORK

A. Agency
Under the United States FOJA every "agency" is obligated
to make certain records available for public inspection. 95 The
1996 FOTA amendments define the term "agency," establishing
96
which institutions are subject to the FOJA requirements.
Signatories to the European Convention agree to abide by
its principles. 97 Later in the Convention, article 10 states that
"(e)veryone has the right to freedom of expression," which includes the right "to receive information and ideas without interference by public authority. . . 9 These provisions establish a
duty on States parties to the Convention not to interfere with
any individual's right to receive information and ideas.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 21 (quoting Leander Case, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1987)).
94. Id. at 23.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
96. Id. According to the FOIA, " ' agency' includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment of the executive branch (including the Executive Office of the President),
or any independent regulatory agency. .. " Id. § 552(f)(1) (Supp. 1996).
97. See European Convention, supra note 16, at preamble (indicating that "[tihe
Government signatories hereto... Have agreed as follows ... 2).
98. Id. at art. 10.
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In the Gaskin Case, the local authority, which kept records
on Mr. Gaskin, was under a duty not to interfere with his requests to access those records. The case took place in Great
Britain. 99 As a Member State, the British government is prohibited from interfering with an individual's "right to receive information." The Liverpool City Council, which is part of the British
government, maintained custody of Mr. Gaskin and created and
obtained records concerning him until his 18th birthday. 10 As a
part of the British government, the Liverpool City Council was
obligated by the terms of the European Convention to not interfere wit Mr. Gaskin's right "to receive information."
B. Improperly Withholding Agency Records
When agency records are improperly withheld under the
FOIA, federal district courts are empowered to enjoin the
agency from withholding the records. 10 1 A broadly similar provision in the European Convention gives the ECHR the authority
to settle disputes
regarding article 10 and the right to receive
10 2
information.
Under the FOIA, any requested agency records that are
withheld that do not fall within one of the nine exemptions are
"improperly" withheld. 10 3 When a complainant establishes that
an agency has withheld a requested agency record, the agency
has the burden to show that the withheld record is exempted
from access under section 552(b) of the FOIA and thus has not
been "improperly" withheld.'04
Similarly, article 10 of the European Convention provides,
certain exceptions to the general rule that everyone has "the
right.., to receive... information... without interference by
public authority."10 5 It can be inferred that the requestor has a
right to receive information if the request does not fall under
within an "exception" of article 10. Deciding whether a record
99. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ratified the Convention on March 8, 1951. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 n.1.
100. Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at 8-9.
101. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 445 US. 136, 139
(1980).
102. European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 53 (stating that "ft]he High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which
they are parties).
103. United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 US. 136, 151 (1989).
104. Id. at 151.
105. European Convention supra note 16, at art. 10.
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has been "improperly" withheld is determined by answering the
question whether the request falls under one of the accepted
exemptions.
In determining the meaning of the word "withheld," as it is
used in the FOIA, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that "Congress used the word in its usual sense,"1 6 and that
"[n]othing in the history or purposes of the FOIA counsels contorting this word beyond its usual meaning."1 7 The common
meaning of the word "withhold" is "to keep back" or "to retain
08
possession or control."
Article 10 establishes that a member state may not interfere with an individual's right to receive information. 0 9 The
duty not to interfere is a broader prohibition than the duty not
to withhold. Withholding records is one way of interfering with
an individual's right to receive information. Thus, the duty imposed by article 10 on the member states includes the duty not
to "withhold" information and ideas.
The local authority in the Gaskin Case "withheld," and thus
necessarily "interfered with" access to the requested documents." 0 The local authority was in possession of 352 documents
pertaining to Mr. Gaskin, and denied him access when he requested it."'
The U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine if documents are "agency records" under the FOIA." 2 In
order to satisfy this prong of the test a document must be (1)
created or obtained by an agency and (2) under agency control
at the time of the request." 3 Article 10 of the European Convention prohibits interference with the right to receive "information." Like the term "interfere," "information" is a sweeping
term. The "agency record" term under the U.S. FOIA establishes
a narrower standard for access.
106. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 445 US. 136, 151
(1980).
107. United States Dep't. of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 US. 136, 150 (1989).
108. XX Ox oRD DIcTIoNARY 455 (2d ed. 1989).
109. European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10 (conferring "the right.., to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers).
110. Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (Walsh, J. dissenting) (noting applicability of article 10(2) to the proceedings and indicating that the withholding was
permitted under the Convention).
111. Id. at 12.
112. United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts 492 US. at 144-45.
113. Id.
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In the Gaskin Case, Mr. Gaskin's requests would have met
this narrower U.S. standard. The local authority kept a case record on Mr. Gaskin pursuant to its statutory duty.114 Gaskin's
case record consisted of 352 documents contributed by 46 persons.115 Although the details of the local authority's record maintenance procedures are not made known by the report of the
case, apparently these records were created and obtained on a
running basis during the approximately 17 years that Mr. Gaskin was in the custody of the local authority. Mr. Gaskin's requests meet the first prong of the Tax Analysts test because the
files in his case record were either created by the staff of the local authority or obtained from other contributors by the local
authority.116 Mr. Gaskin's requests meet the second requirement
of the Tax Analysts test, even considering the recent decision of
Tax Analysts /.11 7 The records Mr. Gaskin requested were under
agency control at the time of his request. Not only did the local
authority have the requested records in its possession at the
time Mr. Gaskin requested access to them, there was no claim
by any of the contributors that the local authority's use of the
documents was restricted by an agreement between the local authority and the contributor." 8 Both are important factors in de114. Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (referring to the Boarding out of
Children Regulations 1955, which establishes a duty for local authorities to keep a case
record in respect of every child in care).
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id. at 9 (identifying "the principal contributors to those case records were medical practitioners, school teachers, police and probation officers, school workers, health
visitors, foster parents and residential school staff.").
117. Tax Analysts v. United States Dept. of Justice, 913 F.Supp. 599, (D.D.C. 1996),
aff'd, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997)[hereinafter Tax Analysts Il]. The District Court in
7hx Analysts gave only general guidance as to the meaning of "control" by stating that
the control inquiry focuses on an agency's possession of the requested materials, not on
its power to alter the content of the material it receives. Id. at 602-603. This implies
that an agency's possession of a document at the time of a FOIA request is determinative as to whether it has "control" of the document. However, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia found that "'control' is not determined solely by possession. Rather the question is whether, considering all of the circumstances of the case
including, of course, physical possession, the records at issue are 'subject to the free disposition of the agency." Id. at 603 (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 347 (D.D.C.
1979)).
118. See Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12. Nineteen of the 46 contributors to the case record consented to disclosure. The records from those contributors were
sent to Mr. Gaskin. The other contributors refused to waive confidentiality stating as
reasons that third party interest could be harmed,; that the contribution would be of no
value if taken out of context; that professional confidence was involved; that it was not
the practice to disclose reports to clients; and that too great a period of time had elapsed
for a letter or report still to be in the contributors recollection. Id. at 12.
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termining whether requested records are under agency control. 119 The documents that Mr. Gaskin requested fall under the
FOIA as "agency records" and thus would be required to be disclosed under U.S. law.
Under the FOIA an agency is not obligated to create records
or retain records before a request has been made. 2 0 Nor is there
any indication in the text of the European Convention that
there is an affirmative duty to create records or retain records
before a request has been made. However, this element was not
at issue in the Gaskin Case. Mr. Gaskin requested records that
already existed.Y1 In addition, Mr. Gaskin's request did not impose an extra burden on the local authority to retain any
records.m
The purpose, interest, identity, or status of the person seeking information has no bearing on whether that person has a
right to request agency records under the FOIA.12 As one court
noted, in an opinion written during the Cold War, a Soviet embassy military attache could file FOIA requests for information
from the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
on the
4
same basis as a citizen of the United States.12
The European Convention establishes that everyone has the
right to receive information.2s The term "everyone" implies that
the right to receive information is not based on one's identity. In
addition, there is nothing in the language of article 10 implying
that the purpose for which one seeks information affects the
right to receive the information. The only limiting language in
article 10 is the provision which establishes exceptions to the
119. Tax Analysts II, 913 F. Supp. at 602.
120. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 445 US. 136, 152
(1980) (indicating that the only obligation on an agency is "to provide access to those
[documents] which it in fact has created and retained."); Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F.
Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds 924 F.2d
282 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (citing Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 152 (1980)).
121. See Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12.
122. See id. at 9. Under the Boarding out of Children Regulations 1955 (which were
made under section 14 of the 1948 Act) the local authority was under a duty to keep a
case record in respect of every child in care for at least three years after the child to
whom it relates has turned 18 years of age or has died before attaining that age. Id.
123. Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 596 F. Supp. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(undocumented alien had FOIA standing; purpose of 1966 amendments in removing
"persons properly and directly concerned" limitation from statute was to broaden standing); Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 121 (D.D.C. 1975) (requesting party need show
no particular interest in requested records).
124. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 730 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting possibility of wholly fictitious entity having standing under FOIA).
125. See European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10.
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right to receive information. 26 Neither the purpose for receiving
information nor the identity of the requestor is mentioned. In
the Gaskin Case, Mr. Gaskin was a British citizen who requested discovery of information in order to bring proceedings
against the local authority for damages for negligence for the
time he was under the local authority's care.2 7 The interest and
identity of Mr. Gaskin are irrelevant under the European Convention just as they would be under the FOIA
Similarly, in Attorney-General of Antigua v. Antigua Times,
Ltd.,2 8 the court held that article 10 of the European Convention covers expression by legal or artificial persons as well as of
natural persons. In De Geillustreerde Pers NV v. Netherlands,
the court held that the right to impart information belongs only
to the owner of the intellectual property in the information,
while also holding that the value to be preferred by article 10 of
the European Convention is the free flow in information to the
public in general.129
An FOIA record must be "reasonably described" in a written
request in order to obligate the agency to make the requested
record available. 130 If "the agency is able to determine 'precisely
what records are being requested,'" the record is "reasonably described" 1' 3 As a practical matter, it is a necessary requirement
that a request for information be described in a manner which
allows the government to identify the record being requested. It
would be unreasonable to obligate the searcher to find a document that has been vaguely or inadequately described.
In the Gaskin Case, Mr. Gaskin's request for information
was specific and reasonable. He made an application under section 31 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 for discovery of
the local authority's case records made during his period in
care. 132 The local authority was under statutory obligation to
maintain a case file on every child under its care during the
time the child is in its care. 33 This would imply that every child
has a file under which all contributed documents are placed and
126. Id. at art. 10(2).
127. Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (sen A) at 9 (1989).
128. [19751 3 All E.R. 81 (Privy Council), as reported in PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HuMAN RIGHTS 331 (1983).
129. (5178/71) Report: DR 8,5, as reported in id. at 337.
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (1996 & Supp. 1997).
131. Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 E2d 315, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument that request for computer records did not reasonably describe records;
test is whether agency can determine which records are sought).
132. Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (sen A) at 9 (1989).
133. Id. at 9.
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could be easily identified and accessed upon a request for all
records pertaining to a particular child. This is the type of request made by Mr. Gaskin. In addition, the local authority made
no argument that it was too difficult1 or
burdensome to identify
4
the records requested by Mr. Gaskin. 3
The FOIA lists nine exemptions which, if asserted properly,
serve to justify an agency's refusal to grant a request for an
agency record. 13 5 An agency must disclose agency records to any
person under § 552(a) "unless they may be withheld pursuant 1to
36
one of the nine enumerated exemptions listed in § 552(b)."
These exemptions are generally interpreted very narrowly 137
and are "explicitly exclusive! 138
Similarly, article 10(2) of the European Convention, lists exceptions to the rights established in the previous section. Section 2 establishes that the rights of section 1, may be:
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary."1 9

In Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, the ECHR
rejected a national security justification for an injunction
against publication of an English spy's memoirs after the information was in the public domain.14° The case generally supports
the proposition that article 10 exceptions must be narrowly construed, permitting restrictions only to the extent necessary to
134. Id. at 12. The facts of the Gaskin Case point out that Gaskin's record "con-

sisted of some 352 documents contributed by 46 persons." The ability of the local authority to identify that Mr. Gaskin's record consisted of 352 documents, a very specific deter-

rnination, would preclude the local authority from arguing that it is not able to precisely
determine the records being requested.
135. 5 US.C. § 552(b)(1-9) (1996 & Supp. 1997). Exempted matters include: (1) certain matters of national security; (2) internal agency personnel rules; (3)matters exempted by another statute; (4) trade secrets; (5) inter- or intra-agency memorandums;
(6) files which if disclosed would be an invasion of personal privacy, (7) records compiled
for law enforcement purposes; (8) financial audit information and;(9) geological data. Id.
136. United States Dept. of Justice v. Julian, 486 US. 1, 8 (1988).
137. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982).
138. Administrator, F-A-A. v. Robertson, 422 US. 255, 262 (1975).
139. European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10(2).

140. Case of the Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 34-35 (1992).
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protect the interests recognized thereby.14 ' This concept of proportionality is usually expressed in terms of the "margin of appreciation" for national interests, and the need to defer to a
showing of "necessity" by the government justifying the restriction.14 The Court's supervision of a state's margin of appreciation "must be strict" and the "necessity for restricting [those
rights] must be convincingly established."1
The ECHR's ruling in the Gaskin Case is consistent with
the European Convention. The local authority's primary reason
for not granting Gaskin access to the requested files was that
the many people who created the file were assured that the information they contributed would be kept in confidence.'" Article 10(2) establishes that rights conferred in section 1 are subject to restriction in order to "preven[t] the disclosure of
information received in confidence." 45
This result is also consistent with the principles of the US.
FOIA. Section 552(b)(7)(D) establishes that a "record or information compiled for law enforcement purposes (are not subject to
disclosure if it) ...

could reasonably be expected to disclose the

identity of a confidential source.., which furnished information
on a confidential basis.""' Admittedly, the exception under the
FOIA is narrower than the one established by the European
Convention. More importantly, both the FOIA and the European
Convention recognize the principle that access to certain information must be restricted when a third party has been assured
confidentiality.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE LEA NDER CASE UNDER THE FOIA
FRAMEWORK

Conducting the same analysis with respect to the Leander
Case, 47 another ECHR decision, one finds the same consistency
between the U.S. FOIA and the European Convention. The
FOIA framework is also appropriately used to analyze the Leander Case.
141. Id. at 33-34.

142. MARK W. JANis FT AL, EUROPEAN HuI.AN RIGHTS LAw: TEXT AND MATERIALS 16768 (1995); see also HowARD CHARIEs YOURow, THE MARGIN OF APPRECTION DOCTUNE IN
THE DYNAMICS OF EuRoPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13-15 (1996) (defining the national margin of appreciation doctrine).
143. Autronic A.G. v. Switz., 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26-27 (ser. A)(1990).
144. Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-12 (1989).
145. European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10(2).
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1994).
147. 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (se. A) (1987).
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A. Agency
In the Leander Case, the Swedish government was part of
the burdened class that was under a duty not to interfere with
Mr. Leander's right to receive information. Sweden is a Contracting State to the European Convention. 148 This obligates
Sweden to abide by its provisions.
B. Improperly Withholding Agency Records
In the Leander Case, the Swedish Government "withheld"
and necessarily "interfered with" access to the information
which Mr. Leander requested. Mr. Leander made several requests to have access to the information on which the Navy
based its decision to not grant him a security clearance.149 The
Swedish National Police Board wrote that the information Mr.
Leander sought had been entered into a secret register and
could not be revealed for reasons of security.150 Because the
Swedish government possessed the information sought and held
it back, the information was withheld from Mr. Leander.
Under the European Convention, the "right to receive information" is sweeping in its scope. Mr. Leander's request fell
within the right conferred by the European Convention, and
also satisfies the FOIAs more stringent standard that only documents that are (1) created or obtained by an agency and (2)
under agency control at the time of the request' 1 are subject to
the FOJA. As discussed above, the Swedish government entered
15 2
the information concerning Mr. Leander into a secret register,
thus satisfying the "create or obtain requirement." The "control"
requirement of his request was satisfied, assuming that the secret register was in the possession of the National Police Board.
The Police Board never argued that it did not possess the register or that it was under some obligation to another party not to
release the contents of the register.
148. Id. at 6; Sweden ratified the European Convention on Feb. 4, 1952. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 n.1.
149. Leander, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 9-12.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Compare id. at 29 (holding that article 10 of the European Convention does not
confer a duty on the government to impart information about an individual which is contained in a register to that person), with Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 US.
136, 144-45 (1989) (establishing two prong test for requested materials to qualify as
"agency records").
152. Leander, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 9-12.
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Like the Gaskin Case, there was no dispute in Leander over
whether the Swedish Navy had a duty to create records or retain records before a request was made. Also like the Gaskin
Case, the interest and identity of the requestor are irrelevant
under the European Convention just as they would be under the
FOIA. In Leander, there was no issue as to whether Mr. Leander's request for information was specific enough. The Police
Board knew what information Mr. Leander was requesting and
where it was located.
The ECHR decided the Leander Case properly under the
"national security" exception of the European Convention. This
decision is also consistent with the U.S. FOIA. Article 10(2) of
the European Convention provides that the right to receive information, which is conferred in article 10(1), may be restricted
"in the interests of national security."15 3 In the Leander Case, the
government denied Mr. Leander's request because the information he sought was part of a secret police register.154 The police
kept the register to use in "the prevention and detection of offenses against national security," thus the contents of the register were made confidential. 155 The court reasoned that Sweden's
interest "in protecting its national security must be balanced
against the seriousness of the interference with the applicant's
right ....

"

On this basis the court stated that the "interests of

national security prevailed over the individual interests of [Mr.
Leander]."156 The
U.S. FOIA recognizes the same "national secur157
ity" exception.
The analysis of the Leander and Gaskin cases using a FOIA
framework underscores the consistency in principles between
the rights conferred by the European Convention and those conferred by the U.S. FOIA. Both recognize a very broad general
right for every person to receive information. Both establish exceptions to the right and interpret those exceptions narrowly.
C. Information Monopolies
In X v. Sweden, the European Commission on Human
Rights held that the licensing privilege under article 10(1) does
not bar monopoly licensing systems, at least with respect to
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10(2).
Leander, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 27.
5 US.C. § 552(b)(1). According to the FOIA, matters that are "specifically authorized ... to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy .
are exempt from disclosure. Id.
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public television.1 58 But, in InformationsvereinLentia v. Austria,

the ECHR held that a public monopoly on broadcasting violates
article 10 unless it can be justified for one of the permissible licensing objectives.1 59 Ordinarily, the court reasoned, impartiality, balance and diversity are better assured by competition
than monopoly. 60 In Autronic AG v. Switzerland, the Court held
that Switzerland's prohibition of reception of satellite transmissions from Russia intended for the general public violated
the
61
Convention and were not justified by paragraph two.

These cases, taken together, suggest that international
human rights law should be skeptical of information monopolies,
whether they are manifested by exclusive markets for television
stations, or exclusive distribution rights for public information.
A diversity of channels and sources is the best approach for disseminating information originating with public institutions, and
is most consistent with the underlying right to receive such
information.
VI. ENFORCEABILITY OF TREATY-BASED RIGHTS
Even if the two human rights treaties discussed in this Article grant a right to obtain access to governmental information
and to disseminate it, that right is not necessarily directly enforceable by requesters in national court. When a treaty based
obligation is directly enforceable in national courts, the treaty is
said to have "direct effect." 62 While direct effect of a treaty is a
matter ultimately to be determined by the intent of the drafters
and signatories of the treaty, the traditional dualism theory of
international law sharply separates "municipal" (national) law
from international law. International law is a system of rights
and duties between states. Only municipal law addresses rights
and duties of individuals. But there are many exceptions, and
there is some jurisprudential debate whether dualism is the ap158. X v. Sweden, App. No. 3071/67, 26 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 71 (1968);
see also X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4750/71, 4750/71, 40 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 29 (1972); Royal Decree No. 39 of 14 Nov. 1975, 1977 Y.B. EM. CONV. ON H.R.
(Council of Eur.) 771; Royal Decree No. 18 of 27 Dec. 1976, id. at 787, as discussed in
SIEGHART, supra note 128, at 336.
159. Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 276 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
14 (1993).
160. Id. at 16; see also JANis, supra note 142, at 214.
161. Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26-7 (1990).
162. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The InternationalEconomic Law Revolution,
17 U. Pk-J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 41-42 (1996) (explaining direct effect and contrasting public and private international law).

924

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

propriate way of thinking about international law. 63 To give a
treaty direct effect causes international law to reach into the internal (municipal) law of sovereign states. A broad example of
direct effect of a treaty is the European Union, in which everyone accepts that community law, though based on the Treaty of
Rome and its progeny, has direct effect within member states legal orders.M Frequently, in U.S. law, direct effect is referred to
as "self-executing."165 Under U.S. law, there are four factors to be
considered in determining whether a treaty is self-executing:
(1) the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators;
(2) the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for
direct implementation;
(3) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods;
and
(4) the immediate and long range social consequences of self - or nonself-execution. 16

Great Britain does not recognize any treaties as self-executing: "treaties are only part of English law if an enabling act of
parliament has been [enacted].' 6 7 In the United States, some
treaties are self-executing, 68 though most are not.169 Sometimes,
municipal law makes certain treaties self-executing. A clear example is article 18 of the Russian Federation Constitution,
which recognizes that rights and liberties derived under article
17 have "direct effect." 70 Conversely, the U.S. Senate's resolution
163. See generally IAN BRowNmE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

32-34

(4th ed. 1990) (discussing dualism and monism, associating Hans Kelsen with monism).
164. See David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Competition
Law?, 35 HARv. INT'L LJ. 97, 142 (1994); J.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Heltern, The Autonomy
of the Community Legal Order-Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARv. INTL L.J. 411, 412
(1996).
165. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing
cases and distinguishing two meanings of self-executing: (1) not requiring implementing
legislation before becoming federal law, and (2) conferring private rights of action on
individuals).
166. International Association of Independent Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 747 F.
Supp. 1484, 1490 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (enumerating factors).
167. BROWNLm, supra note 163, at 48 (discussing conflicting case law about incorporation of customary international law).

168. Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding treaty to be self-executing); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (finding Warsaw Convention to be self-executing).
169. United States v. Fort, 921 F. Supp. 523, 526 (N.D. IIl. 1996) (Geneva Convention and Protocol 1 were not self-executing, thus providing no basis for enforcement of
private rights in US. Courts).
170. Russ. CONST. art. 18 (stating that "[t]he rights and liberties of man and citizen
shall have direct effect...').
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of ratification to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "declares that the provision of articles 1 through 27 of
the Covenant are not self-executing."171
The European Convention on Human Rights does not necessarily have direct effect within the national legal systems of
member countries (the Russian Constitution provides an obvious
exception).' 7 2 Austria is characterized as having gone furthest in
incorporating the convention, giving the convention the status of
the national constitution and by applying the ECHR's decisions
interpreting the convention through the Austrian constitutional
court. 1'7 3 In Belgium, France, The Netherlands, and Switzerland,

provisions of the convention have direct effect in national law
and can override inconsistent national legislation. 174 In Germany
and Italy, the provisions of the convention have the effect of ordinary legislation and thus cannot override contravening provisions of the constitution. 75 Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Norway enacted legislation in the mid-1990s giving direct effect to
the convention. 7 6 The convention does not have direct effect in
' The Dayton Accords obligate
Ireland and the United Kingdom. 177
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to secure to all persons
the rights and freedoms provided in the European Convention. 78
The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina further obligates
all courts, administrative agencies, and governmental organs to
apply international human rights law.179 This suggests direct
effect.
171. 138 CONG. REc. S4781, S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) ( III(l) of the ratification
resolution to the ICCPR).

172. Nadine Strossen, Recent US. and InternationalJudicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis in Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS

L.J. 805, 808 (1990). Nevertheless, the European Convention has significant effect on the
domestic jurisprudence on many European countries by influencing interpretation of domestic law. Id. at 829 & n.112.
173. JAN15, supra note 142, at 448.

174. Id. at 448-49.
175. Id. at 449.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Dayton Peace Accords, supra note 77, at annex 6, art. 1. This Agreement also
recognizes the rights and freedoms enumerated in other human rights agreements. Id.
at art. 1 & appendix; See also BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. II(A)(2).
179. BosN. & HER& CONsr. art. 6; but see generally John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties and Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992) (arguing that former communist countries should not rush to make treaties self-executing because the respective roles of domestic and international institutions is too little
understood); see also Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in
Domestic Courts, 54 U. CiN. L. REv. 367 (1985) (overview of issues, concentrating on
United States courts).
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The absence of direct effect or self-executing status for the
European Convention is mitigated by the existence of the
ECHR, which has the power to enforce against states the obligations of that convention. While decisions of the court are not directly enforceable under the convention, "the high contracting
parties undertake to abide by the decision of the court" 180 The
Committee of Ministers supervises the execution of ECHR judgments. 181 Typically, a decision by the ECHR finding a member
state in violation of the convention results in the enactment of
legislation by the
parliament of the offending state to bring it
82
into conformity.

As a matter of international law, there are several questions to be addressed in advancing the notion of a freedom of information and open government doctrine rooted in international
human rights treaties. First, there is the question of direct effect. In Russia and the Bosnia Federation, both the European
Convention and the ICCPR have direct effect and can be applied
directly to the constitutional courts of those countries. Most
Western European countries provide for some degree of direct
effect of the provisions of the convention, although not decisions
of the ECHR. In the former communist countries, now members
of the Council of Europe, the question appears still to be open.
The parliaments and constitutional courts of these countries can
determine whether the human rights treaties have direct effect.
They should do so with respect to freedom of information and
open government because of the centrality of those norms to
democratic political systems. Where the international human
rights treaties do not have direct effect, claims of violations of
rights of access to government information based on the European Convention can be brought in the ECHR against any nation that is a party to the Convention. This can potentially result in an ECHR decision that could obligate a parliament to
enact appropriate freedom of information legislation.
Finally, and most modestly, the norms of the Convention
and the Covenant in favor of freedom of information and open
government can and should influence interpretation of national
law when it exists, and is at least generally germane to the subject of freedom of information.
180. European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 53.
181. Id. at art. 54.
182. See generally JANIs, supra note 142, at 433 (observing that the ECHR has consistently taken the position that a state is not required to incorporate terms of convention in national law (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
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The desire of former communist countries for U. S. support
and for membership in the Council of Europe, NATO, and the
European Union offer possibilities for extending open government and freedom of information. Imposition of the following
criteria by the Council of Europe would be particularly beneficial because the Council already includes most of the former
communist countries and because Council human rights criteria
are often embraced as criteria by the other European
institutions.
Freedom of information and open government must become
the norm in all participating countries. Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights recognizes freedom of expression, including the right to receive information. It
is cast in general terms, however, and is explicitly subject to an
exception for "public order.?18 Human rights organizations such
as the Council of Europe, which has responsibility for adopting
recommendations to implement the European Convention on
Human Rights, which interprets the European Convention, and
other human rights organizations must flesh out the details of
basic freedom of expression rights. It must be made clear that
freedom of expression includes the right to have access to basic
governmental documents, including legislation and judicial
decisions.
An individual right to access is not enough if there is not an
effective right to publish. Recent experience in Croatia and Serbia illustrate how important diversity can be in assuring affected channels for information about public affairs. Both Croatia and Serbia used fairly traditional broadcast licensing laws to
shut down radio and television outlets for dissenting voices. In
the case of Serbia, the World Wide Web was used to circumvent
the license-based restriction. The international legal community
needs to respond to this threat in two ways. First, freedom of information and open government policies must make it clear that
a commercial publishing motive does not disqualify anyone from
the right to obtain basic government information. Governmentgranted monopolies over public information dissemination cannot stand in the way of others' right to access and publish the
information. Not only must there be a right to access information, but the government should not be allowed to monopolize
its dissemination.
183. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 19.
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Second, monopoly and censorship operate at several different levels of the chain of production of information. Not only
must publisher monopolies be disallowed in the new media, but
telecommunications regulatory restrictions, including licenses
and concessions, must not be extended to principal elements of
the Internet, including routers, 18 domain name registries, and
Internet Service Providers.'8 Even if national policy maintains
monopolies for telephone and broadcasting, these monopolies
must not be extended into the Internet layer. Recently completed World Trade Organization negotiations on telecommunications markets presented an opportune forum to crystallize
these principles in international law.
Policy initiatives aimed at facilitating entry by diverse providers of information infrastructure elements proceed from the
proposition that both the private and public sector must build
the public information infrastructure. Relying on the public sector alone risks censorship, and is also inconsistent with the current rule of law. Relying on the public sector alone will also result in a much slower pace of innovation because of inadequate
resources, and because competition is an effective spur to reduced prices.
It is essential that the Council of Europe and the international community, including the United States, recognize the potential of the Internet as a technology of freedom and of open
government in all parts of the former communist world. The Internet, and especially the World Wide Web, have already demonstrated their power to circumvent totalitarian efforts to squelch
the free press. B92, a Serbian radio station, was able to communicate its message even though its transmitters were shut
down.8 6 Mr. Matic, editor-in-chief of B92, explained how adequate Internet capacity allows independent radio stations to exchange programming, not only within Serbia, but also with Croatia and Bosnia. 87 Of course, the WWW, as a low-cost userfriendly medium, also represents a new distribution possibility
184. See ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S Gum & CATALOG 24, 512 (2d ed.
1994) (defining a router as a specialized computer switch that directs Internet packets to
their destinations).

185. See id., at 10 (noting that an Internet Service Provider connects users to the
Internet).
186. See Bob Schmitt, Op-Editorial, The Internet Answer to Repress, WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 1997; see also Opennet.Org, Nov. 3, 1997 <http://www.opennet.org> (Website for
Radio B92).
187. Political Turmoil in Serbia: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 104th Cong. 7-9 (1996) (Statement of Veran Matic, editor-in-chief
of Radio B92).
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for journalists at the "retail" level given an adequate Internet
infrastructure. An individual citizen can view the Web page
posted by B92 as well as pages posted by other journalists.
Once the basic legal framework is in place, guaranteeing a
right to access government information and to redisseminate it,
information technology exemplified by the Internet's World Wide
Web can reduce agency costs and improve practical public access. Agencies can set up small Web servers to hold their public
information resources, including primary materials such as judicial decisions and statutes, permitting requestors to access them
directly through the Web from anywhere in the world, without
the necessity for costly processing of ad hoc requests.

